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RULES 
Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8 
in 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
There is no dispute between the parties that this Court has appellate review 
jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate this matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There is no dispute between the parties as to the issues on appeal and the 
applicable standard of review, as all raised issues are questions of law where 
appellate review gives no deference to the agency's prior determination. 
Preservation for Appeal: There is also no dispute that all of the raised issues 
were properly preserved for appeal and that the Petition for Review was timely filed 
with this Court by Petitioner. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE 
The parties do not dispute that Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67 (1975) was the 
permanent total disability statute in effect at the time of Mr. Keller's death and that 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-423 (2003) which was enacted after the ruling by 
Administrative Law Judge Eblen, dismissing the case without prejudice. (10/23/02), 
but before the Order of Dismissal with prejudice by Administrative Law Judge 
Sessions (06/16/06) and the Order Affirming ALJ's Decision by the Utah Labor 
Commission (03/31/09). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts in this matter are simple, straightforward and not really 
disputed by the parties. 
l 
SUMMARY OF REPLY 
The Labor Commission held that Mr. Keller's claim for permanent total disability 
was extinguished upon his death, prior to a final order being entered by the 
Commission on his pending claim, and thus no compensation was owed to him. In 
so ruling, the Labor Commission misinterpreted prior law, ignored relevant statutory 
authority and its own precedent. In so doing, the Labor Commission improperly 
dismissed Petitioner's Application for Hearing with Prejudice. 
A R G U M E N T 
I 
PETITIONER'S AMENDED APPLICATION FOR HEARING WAS IMPROPERLY 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Labor Commission dismissed the 
Amended Application for Hearing with prejudice, but did not make any Findings of 
Face or Conclusions of Law to support that result. 
In Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330,335 (Utah App. 1990), cert-
denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals has previously 
informed the Labor Commission that: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the 
commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factually issue was reached.' [T]he failure of an 
agency to make adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its 
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence is 'clear, 
uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion.' id- (Citations 
ommited). 
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In Milne Truck Lines. Inc. v. Public Service Commission. 720 P.2d 1373,1378 
(Utah 1986) the Utah Supreme Court clearly articulated the proper standard 
regarding findings of fact in Orders from Administrative Agencies like the Utah Labor 
Commission: 
The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent 
findings of fact is essential to a proper determination by an 
administrative agency. To that end, findings should be 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact 
and law, are reached Without such findings, this Court 
cannot... [protect] the parties and the public from arbitrary 
and capricious administrative action. 
The Respondents are unable to cite any Statute or Rule which authorizes the 
dismissal of an Application for Hearing with prejudice under facts as presented in this 
case. Respondent Employers' Reinsurance Fund does cite Utah Code Annotated § 
34A-2-417(b) as authority, but that Statute only allows the dismissal with prejudice 
of a claim for compensation which is barred by the twelve year statute of limitation. 
It is clearly not applicable to this case. 
Administrative Law Judge Eblen's 2002 Order dismissing the claim filed by Mr. 
Keller personally without prejudice was done without request or Motion by any party 
and while two cases seeking clarification of the central point of law were on appeal. 
The dismissal without prejudice impliedly recognized that the case could be refilled. 
The case, was in fact, refilled in 2003 when the Legislature had statutorily clarified the 
law on this point. 
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The Respondents misinterpret Petitioner's claim of "continuing jurisdiction" 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 34A-2-420 (1) (a) which specifically 
provides "The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing." Petitioner's claim of continuing jurisdiction arises from his 1978 
Compensation Agreement for Permanent Partial Disability which was approved by 
the Labor Commission. (R. At 1). 
The concept of a "dismissal with prejudice." meaning that a case can never 
again be refilled, is entirely inconsistent with the Commission's statutorily mandated 
continuing jurisdiction. Petitioner is not attempting to "repoen a workers 
compensation proceeding to consider legal arguments not previously made" as 
alleged by Respondent ERF, rather the Petitioner Estate is attempting to obtain 
resolution of the Permanent Total Disability claim which was filed by Mr. Keller while 
he was alive and only dismissed because of his untimely death. 
II 
A PENDING WORKERS COMPENSATION CLAIM IS NOT EXTINGUISHED 
UPON THE DEATH OF THE INJURED WORKER. 
A. Applicable Statutory Provisions. 
The Respondents do not claim that there is any statutory provision in the Utah 
workers' compensation scheme which would provide that a injured worker's 
compensation claim lapses upon his death. Indeed at the time of Mr. Kellar's death 
the workers compensation act was entirely devoid of any provision addressing that 
4 
situation. 
In 2003, the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-423 (2003), a 
copy of which is attached hereto in Addendum "A", which makes it clear that claims 
like Petitioner's do not lapse on the death of the injured worker. This statute was 
passed at the urging of the Labor Commission following another case which had 
been before this Court and the Supreme Court of Utah raising this very issue. That 
Statute clarified existing law that workers compensation benefits were not 
extinguished upon the death of an injured worker. 
That Statute was enacted after the ruling by Administrative Law Judge Eblen, 
dismissing the case without prejudice. (10/23/02), but before the Order of Dismissal 
with prejudice by Administrative Law Judge Sessions (06/16/06) and the Order 
Affirming ALJ's Decision by the Utah Labor Commission (03/31/09). 
Petitioner readily agrees with Respondents that Statute was not in effect at the 
time of Judge Eblen's Order of dismissal without prejudice and that the Statute is only 
entitled to prospective application. However, in the absence of any prior relevant 
statutory provision it stands as powerful evidence of the law at the time of Mr. Kellar's 
death. It was certainly in full force and effect at the time of ALJ Sessions Order 
dismissing the Petitioner's claim with prejudice and the Utah Labor Commission's 
Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. 
B. Existing Utah Case Law. 
The parties dispute the interpretation which should be grated to the four Utah 
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cases which bare of this point: Heiselt Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah. 197 P. 589 (Utah 1921), Parker v. Industrial Commission. 50 P.2d 278 (Utah 
1935), Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Industrial Commission. 218 P.2d 970 
(Utah 1950) and Caporoz v. Utah Labor Commission. 945 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 
1997). 
It is not really necessary to rehash the parties arguments as they are fairly well 
set out in the respective Briefs. It is important to note however, that an award had 
been made to Mr. Kellar prior to his death. In 1978 he receipted an Award of 
Permanent Partial Disability compensation based on a 25% whole body impairment 
(R. at 1), and that the Estate is not seeking "unaccrued future benefits" but rather only 
benefits for Permanent Total Disability from the date of his total disability status to the 
date of his death. 
The Claimant in Heiselt had been paid all benefits due up to the time of his 
death and his Estate was seeking compensation for periods after his death. That is 
clearly not the case here. Neither the facts nor holding of Heiselt are contrary to 
Petitioner's position herein. 
Parker is not particularly helpful because it was a case involving a 
Compensation Order which had been entered while the Claimant was alive but died 
before all of the ordered payments were made. The Court ordered that payments be 
made to his Estate. The case is only of particular precedence value to this case in 
that contrary to Respondents allegation's, it stands as precedent for an Estate filing 
6 
a claim before the Labor Commission seeking payment of benefits. 
Any contrary language in Pacific States is explained by the fact that it is an an 
occupational disease case from the 1950's and focused on very specific language 
contained in the 1943 occupational disease statute unique to a benefits claim for 
silicosis at that time. It is inapplicable to the present case or even workers 
compensation cases in general. 
Caporoz is readily distinguished because in that case "no claim for total 
disability benefits was ever filed prior to [the injured workers] death." id- at 145. 
When Mr. Keller died, his industrial claim was unquestionably pending before the 
Commission. On December 1, 2000, Mr. Keller filed an Application for Hearing 
seeking Permanent Total Disability benefits on the basis of his injury. His industrial 
claim for benefits included accrued benefits due and owing from his employer. Mr. 
Keller died on September 3, 2002 while his case was still pending. 
None of the four prior cases is dispositive of this case and at worst their 
language is ambiguous. In such a case the well established principal that workers' 
compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding 
benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the 
claim, should be applied. Respondents object that Petitioner is asking for the law to 
be ignored. That is not the case. Petitioner is asking for a resolution in conformance 
with clear present statutory law and one which does not do violence to prior appellate 
rulings. 
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C. Prior Labor Commission Precedent. 
The claim that a workers compensation claim lapses upon the death of an 
injured worker was challenged before this Court in Smith v. Labor Commission. (Ut. 
Ct. App. Case No. 20001019). In that case as in this one, the Labor Commission had 
held on Motion for Review that death of an injured worker extinguished his/her 
workers compensation claim. 
On Petition for Review, however, following oral argument before this Court and 
after the Court referred the case to the Supreme Court of Utah, the Commission 
confessed error and stipulated to remand for the payment of benefits notwithstanding 
the injured worker's demise while his case for benefits was still pending before the 
Commission. 
Respondents are correct in asserting that the Smith case is not res judicata in 
that it involved different parties and does not have binding precedential value. It 
does, however, serve as compelling evidence of how the Labor Commission handled 
cases such as this. The Respondents do not cite any other Labor Commission cases 
which reach a contrary result. 
The record is clear that the Labor Commission recognized that the legal theory 
that industrial claims lapsed upon the death of an injured worker resulted in 
inequitable results. Smith stands as an example of the Commission stipulating to the 
payment of such benefits, notwithstanding its prior Order. The Commission was also 
instrumental in the adoption of Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-423 (2003) which 
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specifically provided that such benefits do not lapse. 
D. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions. 
Given the fact that prior Utah law is somewhat confusing and ambiguous, it is 
appropriate to look to other States to see how they have handled this situation. In the 
majority of cases, they hold that workers compensation benefits do not lapse and 
may be paid to the injured worker's estate. 
In Henry v. George Hvman Construction Co.. 242 U.S. App. D.C. 43,749 F.2d 
65 (1984) the decedent had received temporary total benefits and died of his injuries. 
Had he survived, he would have been entitled to a permanent partial award for loss 
of a leg. His widow was held entitled to both death benefits and the permanent partial 
benefits that would have been due her husband. 
In Snvder Construction Co. v. Thompson. 145 Ind. App. 103, 248 N.E.2d 560 
(1969) the dependent of a deceased employee was held entitled to recover benefits 
for decedent's permanent partial disability, even though no claim for such benefits 
was pending at the time decedent died from unrelated cases. 
Christenson v. Aslesen's Wholesale Food. 345 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 1984) is a 
case where the widow of an employee who died three hours after being in a work-
related accident sought benefits for his permanent partial disability. The Court held 
that, under the statute in effect at the time of death, a claim for disability benefits 
could be maintained even though the employee died before the claim was filed. 
Kozielec v. Mack Mfq Corp.. 29 N.J. Super 272, 102 A.2d 404 (1953) is 
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remarkably on point. In that case, the Court held that the surviving wife of an injured 
employee, either individually as a dependent, or as administratix of his estate, may 
file an original claim for permanent disability where the injured workman during his 
lifetime failed to file such Petition and where his death resulted from a cause wholly 
unrelated to the industrial accident for which compensation is sought, even though 
the statute is silent concerning such relief. 
Bridges v. McCrary Stone Services Inc.. 48 N.C. App. 185, 268 S.E.2d 559 
(1980) is a North Carolina case in which temporary total disability compensation had 
been paid. The Court held that an unreduced award for disfigurement could be made 
to dependents after the decedent's death from unrelated causes. 
In Frederico Granero Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.. 48 Pa. Commw. 252, 
409 A.2d 1187 (1980) the claimant's decedent died approximately two weeks after 
being hospitalized for a compensable injury. No claim for compensation benefits was 
filed during the decedent's lifetime. The Court nevertheless held that the widow could 
receive compensation benefits based on both the decedent's injuries and death, 
following a liberal construction of the Pennsylvania Compensation Act. 
Similar results have been found in New York (Snyder v. Wickwire Spencer 
Steel Co.. 277 A.D. 233, 98 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1950)) and Virginia (County of 
Spotslvania v. Hart. 218 Va. 565, 238 S.E.2d 813 (1977). 
Although there is some contrary authority in other jurisdictions, they are almost 
always the result of controlling state statutes and none of those cases are cited or 
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relied upon by Respondents as having any precedential value. 
E. Public Policy. 
The Respondents position that prior to 2003 and the enactment of Utah Code 
Annotated § 34A-2-423 that any workers compensation benefits lapsed if the injured 
worker did not file a claim and reduce it to an Order prior to his or her death is 
shocking and inequitable. 
Such a legal principal would only encourage employers and workers 
compensation insurance carriers to delay cases, especially where the Claimant is 
seriously injured and there was a likelihood that he or she might die. Such a principle 
would force a severely injured worker in the hospital ICU to interrupt lifesaving 
medical care and rush to the Labor Commission offices to file a claim for benefits. 
However, the mere filing of a claim would not satisfy the Respondents who seemly 
believe that the claim would have to be fully adjudicated and reduced to an Order in 
insure payment to the worker's estate. 
This Court should take judicial notice that the present backlog at the Utah 
Labor Commission between the filling of a Claim for workers' compensation benefits 
and the entry of an award is approximately two years. If a Motion for Review is filed 
by either party the average delay between the filing of the Motion for Review and the 
entry of a dispositive Order by the Commission is just under three years. This is the 
grim fact facing any Utah workers compensation Claimant. 
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Ill 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF DID COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE. 
The Respondent Employer/Carrier's argument on this point borders on 
frivolous and it is not joined in with by the Respondent Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
It is important to note at the outset that Petitioner's Brief was checked in and 
approved as to form by the Court Clerk using the official Brief checklist approved and 
mandated by the Appellate Courts to insure that Briefs do comply with the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Respondent first argue that the Brief did not contain an Addendum including 
the challenged Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Curiously, Respondent in 
addressing the applicable Standard of Review in this case states that "This is a 
question of law where appellate review give no deference to the agency's 
determination." 
Respondent does not cite any Statute, Rule or case law imposing any sanction 
for this inadvertent omission. Certainly Respondent was not surprised, prejudiced or 
even inconvenienced by this omission. Respondent had received a copy of the 
challenged Order Affirming ALJ's Decision directly from the Utah Labor Commission 
on or about March 31,2009. A copy was attached to Petitioner's Petition for Review 
filed with this Court on or about April 29, 2009. A copy was contained in the Agency 
record which Respondent checked out for purposes of preparing its Response Brief 
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and Respondent attaches a copy of the decision to its Brief. 
Respondent next objects that Petitioner did not file a courtesy brief as directed 
by the Court on November 17, 2009. Presumably Respondent is referring to Utah 
Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8 establishing a pilot program of requesting a 
copy of the Briefs in electronic "searchable Portable Document Format (PDF)". 
The Rule recognizes this is merely a pilot program to determine "... the 
feasibility and desirability of requiring parties to provide the Utah appellate courts with 
a courtesy copy on compact disk (CD) of all briefs on the merits." It expressly 
provides a mechanism for parties who lack the technological capability to file such a 
Brief to be excused from doing so. Petitioner filed such a Motion in letter form on 
November 23, 2009. No sanction is provided in the Standing Order for failure to 
comply and again Respondent does not allege that it suffered any surprise, prejudice 
or inconvenience do to this alleged omission. 
Respondent never filed an objection to Petitioner's Brief or moved to strike it, 
nor does it now. It never states what the consequence of the claimed violations of 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure should be. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons above cited, Petitioner continues to respectfully request that 
the Court of Appeals reverse the Labor Commission and direct that the case be 
remanded to the Administrative Law Judge for an evidentiary Hearing on the merits. 
Petitioner further continues to request that oral argument be granted and that this 
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case be reported. 
DATED this 11th day of March, 2010. 
DABNEY & DABNEY, p.c. 
viryniiuo UCIUI icy / 
Counsel for Petitioner, Kefari Mecham \j. 
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Addendum "A" 
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-423 (2003) 
A-2-423 UTAH LABOR CODE 766 
(i) transfer payment rights under workers' com-
pensation; or 
(ii) accept or take any action to provide for a 
transfer of payment rights under workers' compensa-
tion. 
(b) A person may take an action prohibited under 
Subsection (3)(a) if the commission approves the transfer 
of payment rights under/workers' compensation: 
(i) before the transfer of payment rights under 
workers' compensation takes effect; and 
(ii) upon a determination by the commission that: 
(A) the person transferring the payment 
rights under workers' compensation received be-
fore executing an agreement to transfer those 
payment rights: 
(I) adequate notice that the transaction 
involving the transfer of payment rights un-
der workers' compensation involves the 
transfer of those payment rights; and 
(II) an explanation of the financial conse-
quences of and alternatives to the transfer of 
payment rights under workers' compensa-
tion in sufficient detail that the person trans-
ferring the payment rights under workers' 
compensation made an informed decision to 
transfer those payment rights; and 
(B) the transfer of payment rights under 
workers' compensation is in the best interest of 
the person transferring the payment rights un-
der workers' compensation taking into account 
the welfare and support of that person's depen-
dents. 
(c) The approval by the commission of the transfer of a 
>erson's payment rights under workers' compensation is a 
ull and final resolution of the person's payment rights 
mder workers' compensation that are transferred: 
(i) if the commission approves the transfer of the 
payment rights under workers' compensation in ac-
cordance with Subsection (3)(b); and 
(ii) once the person no longer has a right to appeal 
the decision in accordance with this title. 2007 
2-423. Survival of claim in case of death. 
As used in this section: 
(a) "Estate" is as defined in Section 75-1-201. 
(b) "Personal representative" is as defined in Section 
5-1-201. 
The personal representative of the estate of an employee 
idjudicate an employee's claim for compensation under 
tiapter if in accordance with this chapter, the employee 
claim: 
(a) before the employee dies; and 
(b) for compensation for an industrial accident or occu-
itional disease for which compensation is payable under 
ris chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
If the commission finds that the employee is entitled to 
nsation under this chapter for the claim described in 
:tion (2)(a), the commission shall order that compensa-
3 paid for the period: 
(a) beginning on the day on which the employee is 
ititled to receive compensation under this chapter; and 
(b) ending on the day on which the employee dies. 
a) Compensation awarded under Subsection (3) shall 
paid to: 
(i) if the employee has one or more dependents on 
the day on which the employee dies, to the depen-
dents of the employee; or 
(ii) if the employee has no dependents on the day 
on which the employee dies, to the estate of the 
employee. 
(b) The commission may apportion any compensation 
paid to dependents under this Subsection (4) in the 
manner that the commission considers just and equitable. 
(5) If an employee that files a claim under this chapter dies 
from the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the 
basis of the employee's claim, the compensation awarded 
under this section shall be in addition to death benefits 
awarded in accordance with Section 34A-2-414. 2003 
PART 5 
INDUSTRIAL NOISE 
34A-2-501. Definitions. 
(1) "Harmful industrial noise" means: 
(a) sound that results in acoustic trauma such as 
sudden instantaneous temporary noise or impulsive or 
impact noise exceeding 140 dB peak sound pressure 
levels; or 
(b) the sound emanating from equipment and ma-
chines during employment exceeding the following per-
missible sound levels, dBA slow response, and correspond-
ing durations per day, in hours: 
ad Level 
90 
92 
95 
97 
100 
102 
105 
110 
115 
Duration 
8 
6 
4 
3 
2 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.25 or less 
(2) "Loss of hearing" means binaural hearing loss measured 
in decibels with frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 
cycles per second (Hertz). If the average decibel loss at 500, 
1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second (Hertz) is 25 decibels 
or less, usually no hearing impairment exists. i^ffi 
34A-2-502. Intensity tests. 
(1) The commission may conduct tests to determine the 
intensity of noise at places of employment. 
(2) An administrative law judge may consider tests con-
ducted by the commission, and any other tests taken by 
authorities in the field of sound engineering, as evidence of 
harmful industrial noise. 1"7 
34A-2-503. Loss of hearing — Occupational hearing 
loss due to noise to be compensated. 
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to harmftw 
industrial noise or by direct head injur}7 shall be compensated 
according to the terms and conditions of this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) A claim for compensation for hearing loss for harmful 
industrial noise may not be paid under this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, unless it can 1# 
demonstrated by a professionally controlled sound test tha 
the employee has been exposed to harmful industrial noise a 
defined in Section 34A-2-501 while employed by the employ^ 
against whom the claim is made. * 
34A-2-504. Loss of hearing — Extent of employerS 
liability. 
(1) An employer is liable only for the hearing loss of 
employee that arises out of and in the course of the empl°ye 
employment for that employer. , j 
(2) If previous occupational hearing loss or nonoccupat*0*1 
hearing impairment is established by competent evidence 
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